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I In廿oduction
This paper a加sto analyze the Japanese and Chinese''' perception of 
the Soviet military“threat”and their differences through a 回目studyon 
也eirrespective behavior after the Afghan incident of December 1979. 
Here, percept.回nmeans definition of situati＜フボPerceptionis not 
equivalent to image though they are highly related!' Tim田t,・in this 
paper, is defined as: perceived or objectiν・ely悶 isting s伊ISOfぬnger
and t.rouble!•i 
Japan and China, at血ebeginning of 1970s, seemed to have a similar 
perception toward the USSR. China, perce1vmg an increasing threat from 
the USSR after the Soviet military intervention泊Czechoslova』tiain 
August I 968 and a series of Sino」sovietborder conflicts, made a drama-
tic turn to the Umted States m 1971. Only seven months after也e
Sino・AmericanJoint Conununique of February 1972, Japan’s Prime 
Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Beijing and is皿ed.the Sino-Japanese 
Joint Communique血 September1972. Though Japan’s decision to 
shake hands with the PRC was not a consequence of her prudeni calcu-
lation over her st阻teg1csituation血theworld system, 1t certainly pushed 
Japan to lean to血ePRC m血eJapan-China-Russ岨tr恒ngle.
Japan and Chma, when they signed the Smo-Japanese Peace and 
Friendship Treaty in August 1978, seemingly had a s回世町， ifnot iden-
tical, stance in their relationship with the USSR, which was strengthened 
by the subsequent Sino-American normalization in January 1979. The 
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second clause of the treaty, the so-called “anti-hegemonism”clause 
which the PRC insisted on inserting, has been interpreted to be antago-
nistic to the USSR though the Japanese government denied its anti-
Soviet intention by inserting the third clause which claims that the treaty 
is not against any third country -the USSR＇.凶
China’s approach to Japan did not stop only in the diplomatic milieu 
but extended to the, military m1heu as well. 
Su Yu, the Vice-Minister of Defense血血ePRC, remarked that Japan 
could strengthen her defense and increase her defense budget m his talk 
with Hisao lwajima, a member of the National Defense College of the 
Agency of Defense, in March 11, 1980!'1 Wu Xiuqian, the Vice-Chief of 
the General-Staff of the People’s Liberat10n Army, stated that Japan 
could increase her defense budget from the 0.9% level of her GNP to a 
2% level, to Yasuhiro Nakasone, a leader of the Liberal Democral!c 
Party, in April 29, 1980; and Hua Guofeng, the Premier, emphas包edto 
h加 thatJapan should strengthen her air force to maintain her security, 
in April 30,・ 1980!71 China in 1980 supported Nakasone whom she had 
criticized as being a leader of Japan's militarism in 1970. 
The subsequent behavior of the two nations, however, shows a widen-
ing differences in their Soviet policy. Generally, Japan has become more 
antagonistic to the USSR while China slowly but steadily reduced the 
existing tension between China and Ru田ia'" Japan decided to partic1-
pate in the economic sanctions a伊instthe USSR though, as a result, 
Japan would have to sacrifice her economic mterest!" Japan took mea-
sures to reduce the governmental mteraction between Japan and也e
USSR, to put restnctions on the export of strategic and technological 
goods to the USSR, and to put a check on credit loans for the Siberian 
development 
China, in contrast, though postponed by the outbreak of the Afghan 
war, has had talks on the Sino Soviet rapprochement, one in October 
1982 in Beijing and again in March 1983 in Moscow, between China’s 
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Qian Qichen and its Soviet counterpart, 
Leonid Ilyichev.帥
In addit10n, China did not protest against the Soviet deployment of 
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SS-20 in the Far East, which is generally conSidered to be a serious 
血reatto both Japan and Chma, whtle the Japanese government repeated-
ly protested to the Soviet government~＇ 
Facing S加ilarmilitary threat from the USSR and holding tentatively 
similar stance in world politics, why and how are these differences 
made? This is the m吋orpoint to be analyzed, and出ispaper focuses 
ma泊Jyon how. More theoretically, how are these differences in outputs 
created between Japan and China in spite of similar mputs bemg made? 
To answer this question the intervening variables should be analyzed 
Among va口ousintervenmg variables such as domestic politics and inter-
national politics (th田ecan be called environmental 岡市bles),the per-
cept10n of decision-makers has the top priority to be analyzed since it is 
the decision-makers who m actuality produce the policy-outputs; and it 
is the perception which to the largest extent and most directly controls 
the decision-makers' opt10ns on security matters whose objective evalua-
tion is most dif白cult.It is not the attributes of世田町terna!Jonalsyste：加
nor pres血re.of domes!Jc groups which d!fectly define decisions over 
national secunty~＇ 
Hereafter, the term, deciszon-makers in Japan, denotes leaders of也e
LDP, bureaucrats of the gover四nent,mainly of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (the MFA) and the Agency of Defense (or the Defense Agency; 
the AD or the DA), and those financial leaders who have influence over 
security issues?' This paper focuses on the former two actors, and the 
role an・d significance of the financial leaders血securitymatters wil be 
analyzed in a 印刷restudy because pohticians and bureaucrats are more 
influential th阻 economicleaders on military security isues. China’s 
decision-makers means: a group of leaders of the Communist Party m 
China (the CPC), bureaucrats of the State Council, and the military 
leaders of the PLA. 
In making an analysis on the perception of the decision-makers, we 
as剖methat it is possible to fmd a tendency and patterns m their “collec-
tive”percept10n, although we do admit血atas aggregates of individual 
perceptions, there certainly exist differences at the individual level°' 
As for threat, it consists of at least two elements -capability and in崎
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tention (or strategy) of the attacker戸 Theintention of the USSR, or 
血eperception of Soviet intention, should be primarily analyzed since in-
tention of the USSR is more difi叩 Itfor decision-makers of Japan and 
Chma to estimate than the Soviet mtlitary and economic capability to 
attack these countries.百tispaper, regarding threat as皿 entity,w世
analyze its existence and level 
l Existence of the Soviet Military 
The question is d。血edecisionmakers in Japan and China see the 
USSR as a threat to their countries? The answer is yes. Both Japan and 
China have世田 perception也at世田 USSRis a threat to their security. 
δhira’s administ阻tivesp田chin 1980 (see note 9) assumed the existence 
of the Soviet也reatto Japan The succeeding Prime Minister Zenko 
Suzuki generally restrained himself from referring to the Soviet threat 
because he was too much involved with the factional politics within the 
LDP for conducting the pohcy making Nakasone, who was appointed to 
be the Prime Miltister in November 1982, remarked in the Standing Com-
mittee for the Budget of the House of Representatives that Marxism is a 
philosophy of power and出atthe USSR has been increasing its military 
force m Europe and in the Far East, so that we cannot help but choose 
the policy of deterrence and balance of power~＇ Since both deterrence 
and .balance of po wet presume the equilibrium of mutual threat among 
countries, his remark apparently as四mes血atthe USSR is a血reatto 
Japan. 
Bureaucrats in the government also se the USSR as a threat to Japan. 
Hiroaki F吋i,a member of the Asian Bureau of the MFA, pointed out 
血atthe USSR is the cause of instability in Asia -the confrontation in 
the Korean Peninsula, Vietnam’s military mterventrnn m Cambodia and 
Soviet military reinforcement in Asia~＇ Akitane Kiuchi, the Director 
of the Asian Affairs Bureau, supported Fuji's view on the USSR円The
Agency of Defense also perceives the Soviet military threat. The Defe出e
White Paper in 1980 asserted that the USSR was a major threat to 
Japan’s se9unty This was the first tune that the Agency, in its Paper, 
referred to the USSR as a threat to Japan：凶 s百ichiroIt百，theDirector-
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General (Minister of State) of the AD, remarked that Japan should pay 
attenl!on to the Soviet increasing mtlitary presence in Asia m order to 
maintain Japan’s security円
Chm a’s decision司makersapparently see the USSR as one of the major 
threats to China However, on the Significance of the Soviet threat, d正ー
ferent opimons among leaders are observed For example, Hu Yaobang, 
血eGeneral Secretary of the CPC, asserted that the two super-powers, 
both the US and the USSR, are the major threat to world peace [and to 
the security of China］凪hisspeech at the Twelfth Party Congress~＇ Hu 
perceived that China was threatened not ortly by the USSR but also by 
the US Hua Guofeng, in contrast, asserted that the major threat was from 
the USSR. However, neither Hua nor Hu denied the USSR as a曲目atto 
Chma, in spite of their different assessments on the significance of the 
Soviet threat. 
m Level of Threat 
Both Japan and Chma perc白vethe existence of the Soviet military 
由reat,but their perceived levels of threat are far from sunilar General-
ly, Japan perceives an increasing threat from the USSR while China 
perceives a decreasing threat Japan, seeing the Sov10t construct10n of 
military bases in the Kurtle Islands in the late 1978, which Japan claims 
to be her own territory, has already become antagonistic to the USSR. 
The Afi悼anincident was the turning point of Japan’s Soviet policy. In 
1979, before the incident, the Japanese government stil hesitated to take 
le田 friendlyme酷uresto血eUSSR. It ortly protested to the Soviet 
gov er町田ntthrough a diplomatic channel twice加 1979 on February 
5 and on October 2." The A危hancrisis triggered a series of Japan’S 
antagonistic behavior against the USSR. The Minister of Foreign Affa虻s,
Sunao Sonoda, did not refer to the territory issue between Japan and 
the USSR in his speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations in 
September 1979~ but a year later, he criticized Soviet’s behavior in 
血eKurile Island$?' This was the first t泊1ethat the Japanese govern-
ment publicly referred to the territory is四eand criticized the USSR in 
the United Nations. 
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The AD stressed the increasing Soviet military threat to Japan, point-
ing out her military activities in the Kurile Is凶ids.関
The MFA perceives increasing threat from the USSR, too Kiuch1 re-
marks that [not ortly m Europe, but also] in the Far East, Soviet military 
presence has become too powerful，阻dto make matters worse, 1t seems 
to keep its pace and never stops'' Waga G国防 noKinkyo (usually 
translated as The Blue Book), whose content was agreed upon m 
ihe Cabinet meeting in August 1980, waived ihe term“all-direc!!on 
diplomacy”（or“omni-duection diplomacy”） which had been a iheoreti-
cal framework for the expected negotiation with the Soviets over the 
peace treaty and the northern terntory 1s叩e.The strategy of “司1-
duect10n diplomacy" was already being criticized by the LDP in 1979 as 
being practically impossible to carry out."' The ending of“al-
direction diplomacy" seems to show Japan’s theoretical turnabout to 
the Western bloc”ihough Japanese officials recognized a perception 
gap wi出担也eWestern bloc, particularly between Jap皿 andihe Unlted 
States, over the significance of the Soviet ihreat?' 
The evaluat10n of decreasmg threat from ihe USSR 1s, to a certain 
extent, a political necessity for China to promote her economic construc-
tion. Evaluation of the Soviet military threat is deeply related to出e
distribution of her limited resources between two m司ornational pur-
poses economic construction and military security. The decisions on 
limiting resources between them can be made only after China maintains 
a certain level of secunty, but threat is a vague entity that the decision 
cannot be made with a perfect rationality. Also, there is no o切ective
standard of mmimum security Here, factional and organlzational 
politics is introduced into血edecision process凶
The difference is observed between military leaders of世田PLAand 
pre田mablynon-military analysts of the CPC over the Soviet military 
threat. Generally, military leaders emphasized the danger of war and 
perceived世間 consistencyof Soviet’s mihtary pohcy~＇ Informat10n 
analysts, in contrast, stre田edthe shortcomings and weakpoints of the 
military force and economy of the USSR, and were relatively prudent on 
the evaluation of the Soviet threat. On the consistency of Soviet’s pohcy, 
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they denied the existence of“tune-scheduled”strategy." 
Pobtical leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang saw a de-
creasing threat from the USSR~ but there is no evidence that their 
evaluation of decreasmg threat of the Soviet Union 1s approved by 
the majority of the leaders of the CPC, PLA, and the State Council. 
N Intention of the USSR 
The Japanese leaders, generally, perceive the Soviet external policy, 
which can be called her intention, to be expansionistic, and beheve 
that the Soviets will not stop therr exp阻 s10npolicy. 
MFA has the perception that the Soviet Union is trying to isolate 
the US in internal!onal politics.°' 
AD has a similar perception to that of the MFA. 1百eD司f切seWhite 
Paper 1982 asserts that the Soviet Umon intends to divide the Western 
bloc by her “peace offensive.”関 Italso a田ertsthat the Soviets have 
血eperception that a war [the world war] 1s inevitable so long as nn-
perialism exists in the world, and that白eUSSR considers the military 
power as its indispensable means for carrying out her defense and 
external policy戸
The LDP has a sophisticated analysis on the driving force behind the 
Soviet expansionistic policy. They assert that-the Soviet external policy 
has been shaped mainly by three factorsー themomentum of the Soviet 
bureaucracy, unsatisfied desire for her national secunty, and her in-
ferionty complex toward Western Europe!" 
China’s perception of the Soviet mtenl!ons, entangled with her ases-
rnent of the Soviet mtlitary and economic capabtl1ty, will be analyzed 
in another paper. Generally, Chinese leaders seem to believe that the 
domestic problems泊 theSoviet Union will make her become les expan-
sionistic in the future. 
V Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
This paper, so far, concentrates on the comparison of Japan’s and 
Chma's perceptions of the Soviet mtl1tary threat，自由mmgthat their diι 
ferent perceptions can be analyzed凪aparallel manner. The as田mption
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of a perfect parallel was necessary to have only a m泊imumnumber of 
analytical concepts and to keep the Occam’s razor sharp with a nsk of 
makmg an analy!Jcal deviation. Here, influence of domestic polilics and 
international politics on their perceptions of the Soviet threat wtll be 
briefly discussed to min泊1包ethe deviation of the analysis. 
Among Japan’s domestic factors relevant to the is田eof the Soviet 
threat，“ukei-ka”(leaning to the right) may be most important. Ukei-ka 
represents an aspect of Japan’s desire to recover the autonomy as a 
nation lost by her defeat in the Second World War. As the first step of 
the recovery, it is requested that her nat10nal security be mamtamed in 
diploma!Jc and military ma凹iers.National security as a political is四e
has been a taboo because it has often been associated with her militari町1
in the past. Emphasis on increasing threat from世田USSR,in part, is a 
political nece田ityfor justi命mgJapan’S internal ukei-ka. Jn practical 
politics, it白nct10nsto justify the mcrease of her defense budget. 
In mternat10nal milieu, Japan faces pres田refrom the NATO countnes 
to increase her defense budget and as叩meher respons白血tyas a member 
of the Western bloc" However, the Japanese gover町nentcannot in-
crease her defense budget just because of pressure from the US and West-
em Europe. Pressure alone is not convmcing enough for the Japanese to 
自由meresponsibility as a member of the developed nat10ns in the West-
em bloc. The image of Japan threatened by the USSR is employed in 
order to warrant such a move. Here, a lmk between international poli!Jcs 
and domestic politics is observed. 
China’s perception of the Soviet military由reatshould be analyzed 
within the multilateral relationships副nongChina, the USSR and the US, 
because it has changed prunarily as a result of overall assessment of 
China’s strategic situation in the Russo American balance. The Smo-
American rapprochement of 1971-1972 was, to a certam extent, a com-
promise between the declining US and the frightened China in the face of 
an increasmg Soviet threat. Gradual泊1provementof the Sino Soviet 
relationship in the early 1980s 1s mairtly a result of Chma’s disillusion-
ment with the utility of世田 Sino-Americanrapprochement側
There 1s a lmk between China’s diplomatic change and its domestic 
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politics. The rapprochement in 1971・1972was obviously related to也e
Lin Biao afairs. China’s concession in the negotiation proce田 of也e
Sino-Amencan normalization was 1mtiated by Deng Xiaoping to maintam 
his advantage over Hua Guofeng and his supporters M世間 thirdplenum 
制＠of the Eleventh Central Committee of December 1979. The cooling-
off of the Smo-Amencan relationship, in part, 1s a reaction of China’s 
over-concession to the US.“Perception”of decreasing threat from the 
USSR, expre田edby the Chinese government, may be a ballon d’酎＇Saifor 
也eSino-USSR rapprochement. 
We have thus ex田ninedJapan’s and China’s different perceptions of 
the Soviet mtlitary threat its existence, levels, and mtentions Both 
countries perceive the USSR as their threat, but Japan sees .it as卸creas-
ing while China considers 1t decreasing・Wealso have found the critical 
influence of domestic politics and international poli!Jcs to their respec-
t1ve percep!Jon of the Soviet threat. 
In conclusion, the as四mptionof the decision-makers' perceptions 
as an intervening variable must be cntically re-examined. In bilateral 
relationship between the USSR and Chma and between Japan and the 
USSR, the as四mptionof then respec!Jve perceptions as an intervening 
variable is valuable as a working hypothesis, but it loses its validity when 
the analytical田ope1s expanded to mclude the mfluence of internat10nal 
system and of domestic politics, since perception cannot be defined 
solely as an intervening variable but has the characteristics of dependent 
and mdependent vanables at血eS世間tune.At domestic level, perception 
of threat is a variable controlled by the decision-makers. On the level of 
international pohtics, more strictly, m the multilateral relations in the 
international system, perception of the decision-makers is partly a de-
pendent variable on which decision-makers make their decisions and 
partly an independent variable which the world system defines in a very 
fuzzy manner. 
An analy!Jcal concept which has the characteristics of the three 
variables at the s田net卸iewill lose or greatly reduce its analytical utility. 
Re-examinatrnn and systematic clarification of perceptrnn as an analy!J-
cal tool is nec師団ryfor further analysis. 。fay31,1983) 
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Notes 
(I) In this paper, China means the People's Republic of China. 
(2) Ole Holsti, Richard Brody, and Robert C. North (1969). 
(3) Image can be defined as the organized represen師t臼nof an object. 
See Herbert C. Kelman (1965), p 24. Perception does not neces-
sarily have an organized structure of representation while image 
m田thave. 
(4) For a detailed discussion on the definition of threat, for instance, 
see The Kokusai Mondai [Internatzonal Affairs] No 217 (April 
1978), the Special Issue on National Security and Economy. 
(5) Tomoh1阻 Sakanaka(l 978). 
(6) Haruo Tobari (1981), p. 94. 
(7) Ibid., pp. 94-95. 
(8) In terms of“absolute level" of tension, China may stil have a 
higher tension in the relationship with the USSR than Japan has, 
but in terms of血e“direction”oftension vector, China may have 
the minus sign and Japan has the plus sJgn 
(9) Waga Gazko no Kmkyo 1981 (usually translated as The Blue Book, 
1981), p. 333 of“Prime Minister Ohira’s Administrative Speech, 
January 25, 1980”． 
(IO) In 1981, Deng Xiaoping remarked that the Sino USSR negotiation 
over出eirborder is one thing and the Af凶anincident is another 
世出E(Asahi Evening News December 21, 1981). 
(I I) Tomoyuki Kojima (I 983). And see Special Editorial of the 
Renmin Ribao [The People’s Daily] November I, 1980, and 
Ambassador Li Luye’s speech in Geneve in February 1980, (The 
Asahi Shimbun [The Asahi Newspaper] February 9, 1980）ー
The Asahi Shimbun February 19, 1983. 
(12) For a discussion of perception as an analytical tool担 international
relations, for example, see Robert Jervis (1970) 
(13) Ministry of International Trade and Industry is a major org四 iza-
ti叩 alactor in Jap叩’ssecurity policy in general. However, MIT! 
seems to remain a minor actor over the specific issue of Soviet 
m出tarythreat, compared to other economic security-related issues 
such as the trade friction with白eUS and EC.ぱ The Asahi 
Shimbun May 21, 1983, p. 4 
(14) Different orgamzahonal and factional interests, various types of 
personalities and beliefs四dother seemingly non-political factors 
may define the differences of perception of the decision-makers 
(I 5) Dean G Pruitt, and Richard C. Snyder (1969), pp. 22-26. 
(16) The Asahi Shimbun February 7, 1983. 
(17) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan (b), 1981, pp. 24-25. 
(18) Ibid., 1981, p. 79. 
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(19) Agency of Defense, 1982, p. 35. 
(20) The Minutes of the Special Committee on National Secunty, House 
of Representatives, January 24, 1982, pp. 1-3, Speech of Soichiro 
Ito, the Director-General of the Agency of Defense However, 
some members of the Agency consider that the Pacific Fleet of the 
USSR, which is usually thought to be the major threat, does not 
constitute Soviet major threat to Japan. See the Mmutes of the 
Special Committee on National Secunty, House of Representatives, 
April 12, 1982. cf. Yono四keNagai (1978). 
(21) Renmin Ribao September 8, 1982. 
(22) MFA (a) !980, p. 135. 
(23) Ibid., pp. 369-377. 
(24) MFA (a) 1981, pp. 399-400. 
(25) AD, 1982, pp. 28-32. cf. the Mmutes of the Specral Committee on 
National Secunty, House of Representatives, April 12, Speech of 
Koichi Arai, the Counc出orof也eAgency of Defense. 
(26) MFA (b) 1983, p. 73. 
(27) LDP (a) 1979, pp. 12 13. 
(28）“All-direction diplomacy" and“eqm-distance diplomacy”are 
analytically different concepts -the latter requires Jap町i'sneut阻ー
!ity m 也etnangle of the US, China, and the USSR, while the 
former does not -but are often used mterch皿geably.The Docu-
ment of the LDP (a) 1979 (see note 27) cnticizes the impractica-
b出tyof the all-direction diplomacy. 
(29) The Asahi Nenkan [The Asahi Yearbook] 1982, p. 213. 
(30) For the dis叩 ssionon the significance of factional and bureaucratic 
politics in China, for example, see Ryo Ota (1981). 
(31) For example, see Xu Xiangqian (1977) and Zhang Aiping (1983). 
cf. notes 12-17 of Herbert S. Yee (1983) .and Shigeo Hrramatsu 
(1979). 
(32) Qi Ya and Zhou Jirong [1981 (a), 1981 (b)], Xing Shugang, Li・
Yuhua and Liu Yingna (1983). 
(33) For example, Deng Xiaoping (1982), Hu Yaobang (1980; a secret 
speech, autumn 1980, The Asahi Shimbun March 21, 1983, p. 6) 
(34) MFA (b) 1983, p. 52. 
(35) AD 1982, p. 7. 
(36) Ibid. 
(37) LDP (b) 1979, pp. 22-27. LDP in 1979 alread~ surveyed the 
hmitation of China’s pro-West policy and the mevitability of the 
Sino-USSR rapprochement Ibid., pp. 4ι45. 
(38) The Kokusa1 Nempo [Thelnternatwnal Yearbook], pp. 117-121 
(39) Qi Xin (1983), p. 52. 
(40) Haruo Tobari (1983), pp. 81-82. 
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ソ連軍事的「脅威」に対する
日中両国の認識とその差異
一 1979年アフガニスタン事件前後
〈要約〉
太田 亮
イシプット
ソ連の軍事的「脅威」という類似した入力にもかかわらず，日本と中
アウトプヲト
国の対外政策という出 力の様相はかなり異なっている。本稿は，媒介
＂ー セプシヨシ
変数としての両国政策決定者の「脅威」認識に焦点をあて，その相違
点をさぐる。細かくみると，両国ともに政策決定者集団の成員の属する
組織や派閥，彼らのパーソナリティなどの相違などに起因する認識の差
異が存在するが，大まかなパターンは観察される。すなわち，両国共に
「脅威Jの存在自体については一致しているが，そのレベルや増減の方向
については認識が異なる。日本は「脅威」の絶対水準は低いが増加傾向
にあると見，中国は絶対水準は高しまた減少方向にあると断言しない
までも，ソ速の直面する軍事的・経済的制約に以前よりも注目すること
が多くなった。ソ速の意図については，日本はひきつづき拡張を試みる
とするが，中国はしばらくの聞は大規模な拡張の意図はないとする。
これら 2国聞の比較は，厳密にはパラレルではない。国際政治全体（特
に対米関係）においての戦略的条件などがかなり異なるので，両国の対外
政策・認識において無条件の比較はできない。また，「脅威」は国際・国
内政治の要請から故意に誇張または過少評価されるので，その度合の
エステイメーション
推定も将来の課題の1つである。さらに，国際・圏内政治要因の導
入によって，認識は入力・出力の性格をもあわせもつようになり，認識
を媒介変数とする定式化それ自身も再検討を要することとなるロ
